Rating the ratings

Amid all the discussion about the role of credit ratings in financial markets before and after the crisis, their actual performance has often been misunderstood, writes S&P’s Blaise Ganguin

Ratings are forward looking opinions of relative creditworthiness, so their performance can be measured by how well they correlated over time with defaults, and by the rate at which they change. While investors, fund managers and advisers may use credit ratings in making investment decisions, S&P’s ratings are not indications of investment merit. In other words, the ratings are not buy, sell, or hold recommendations, or a measure of asset value. Nor are they intended to signal the suitability of an investment. They speak to one aspect of an investment decision – credit quality.

The key test is whether ratings have, generally speaking, effectively rank-ordered credit risks. In other words, have highly rated credits generally displayed lower default rates – and greater credit stability – than credits with lower ratings?

We have acknowledged that the recent performance of certain ratings in two specific areas – US residential mortgage-backed securities and related collateralised debt obligations – has been disappointing, and we have taken major steps to address that. Elsewhere, however, ratings of companies, sovereigns and most classes of structured securities have generally continued to perform well.

The latest studies of corporate defaults spell this out. Between 2008 and 2010 – spanning the worst economic downturn for decades – the global average default rate for companies rated investment grade was 0.9 percent, compared with 13.9 percent for those with a speculative grade rating. None of the 81 rated companies that defaulted in 2010 began the year at investment grade. At the same time, ratings stability increased, with the proportion of unchanged corporate ratings reaching 73 percent: a six-year high.

Overall, the performance of global corporate ratings during 2010 was broadly in line with their strong historic track record. It follows the record 289 defaults among rated companies and financial institutions in 2009, 86 percent of which had a first (original) rating at least three notches below investment grade.

In short, there continues to be a strong correlation between corporate ratings and defaults (the higher the issuer rating, the lower the frequency of default, and vice versa), and higher ratings have consistently demonstrated more stability than lower ratings. This is true for all corporate rating categories and geographic regions – an important point for investors who look to ratings to provide a common and comparable benchmark of credit risk across different sectors, regions and times.

National ranking
A similar picture applies to ratings of sovereign debt. Since 1975, an average of one percent of investment grade sovereigns have defaulted on their foreign currency debt within 15 years, compared with around 30 percent of those at speculative grade. A study of sovereign ratings published last October by the IMF found that ratings provide a robust ranking of sovereign default risk – meaning that defaults tend to cluster in the lowest ratings grades – and noted that all sovereigns that have defaulted over the last 35 years had speculative grade ratings at least 12 months before default.

The recent performance of certain ratings of structured securities has been more mixed. The extreme credit cycle and high unemployment, which has impacted loan repayment, have hurt the performance of many structured finance securities, especially those linked to US mortgages. The ratings of these securities therefore have experienced much greater volatility over the last three years than in the past.

Elsewhere, though, the performance of structured finance ratings has been more in line with expectations. That includes, for instance, US securities backed by credit cards, student loans and other consumer debt, as well as most types of European structured instruments.

Despite the severity of the recession in Europe, default rates for European structured securities have been relatively modest, even among securities with low original ratings. And those securities with high investment grade ratings have been relatively stable in credit terms.

Over the three-year period since June 2007, European structured finance securities rated by S&P have experienced a cumulative default rate of below one percent (by value of original issuance) and a cumulative downgrade rate of under 20 percent. For consumer-related securitisations (residential mortgage securities, structured coverage bonds and consumer asset-backed securities), the cumulative default rate over this period is below 0.1 percent and the downgrade rate around five percent.

No guarantee
Despite the difficult economic situation in Europe, and higher delinquencies and defaults in both corporate and consumer loans backing many structured securities, the cushioning against credit losses in these securities has meant their ratings have generally stood up well.

Importantly too, ratings in recent years have generally been much less volatile than market prices.

Ratings are based on fundamental analysis of credit quality, while bond and credit default-swap prices are driven by the ebb and flow of market sentiment, the liquidity of a security (which can be limited) and other short-term technical factors. That means credit markets are prone to regularly overshoot or undershoot, while ratings take a longer-term view of credit risk and tend to follow a more stable path.

A high rating, of course, is not a guarantee that an issuer or debt issue will not default over time.

Creditworthiness can and does change, sometimes as a result of unexpected and unpredictable events. Even a small fraction of credits originally rated ‘AAA’ have defaulted over the years.

However, it remains the case – as the latest ratings performance data suggests – that higher ratings are generally less prone to default and tend to be more stable than lower ratings.

The analytical and other changes we have made over the last three years underline our commitment to continue doing so in the future. They are aimed at strengthening our ratings so they continue to be broadly comparable across all categories, to be clear and understandable, and to perform as we expect.

Comments: 0
Join the discussion below

The May – June 2013 Issue

Highest corporate tax
rates in Europe

European countries are scrambling to raise every last penny of funds through taxes. But some countries may have gone too far...

Belgium

Though all business taxes in Belgium can be paid online with little effort and preparation, the rates are still sky-high at 57.7 percent, including a staggering 50.8 percent total rate on profits only in social security contributions.

Belarus

In Belarus, a company spends up to 338 hours annually preparing for and paying ten different taxes and duties. The total tax rate has incredibly been lowered to 60.7 percent, from 117.5 percent in 2008.

France

A company in France pays seven different taxes and duties, the sum of which can amount to 65.7 percent of profits; though President François Hollande has announced a wave of business tax rate cuts coming up.

Estonia

A business in Estonia pays 67.3 percent of profits in tax, 37.2 percent exclusively in social security contributions. The country has gone against the grain in Europe by raising businesses taxes from 48.6 percent in 2008 to the current rates.

Italy

While corporate income tax (IRES) in Italy is limited to 38 percent of taxable profit, a company operating in Italy can expect to pay 14 other taxes and duties, including social security contributions, bringing their total payable tax to 68.7 percent of profits, according to the World Bank.

Norway

Norway taxes motor fuels twice, with a road use tax and a CO2 emissions tax. Combined with strikes in the energy sector that have curbed output, the price of gas at a local pump has soared to $10.12 per gallon.

Turkey

Though Turkey sits on the Suez Canal and neighbours many oil rich countries, the price of a gallon of average gas clocks in at $9.41 in Turkish pumps, because of a 60 percent share of taxes. 

Israel

Like Turkey, Israel is surrounded by oil-rich neighbours, but drills very little itself. Gas prices are controlled by the government, so about half of the $9.28 per gallon goes to taxes.

Hong Kong

There are few gas stations in Hong Kong, but the ones available charge up to 76 percent more per gallon than mainland China, where the government caps the cost of fuel. A gallon at the pumps will cost around $8.61 on the island.

Netherlands

Expensive labour costs make the Dutch petrol prices the dearest in Europe, at $8.26 per gallon; though the 57 percent tax add-ons don’t help.

The credit crisis

8 February 2007
HSBC warns of subprime mortgage losses

2 April 2007
New Century goes bus

14 September 2007
Wholesale markets have dried up

17 March 2008
Rescue of Bear Stearns

7 September 2008
Rescue of Fannie Mae

15 September 2008
Lehman Brothers file for bankruptcy

3 October 2008
US congress approves $700bn bailout

14 February 2009
$787bn stimulus approved by congress

 

The effects of the current financial crisis are global and irrefutable. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the domino effect of irresponsible public monetary policies, huge levels of unsustainable debt, and a deregulated financial sector, has escalated to the point where no corner of the globe has been left untouched.

1973 oil crisis

October 1973
Syria and Egypt launch an attack on Israel on Yom Kippur and set off a twenty day war;

1977
US President Carter creates Department of Energy, which develops the US strategic petroleum reserve

 

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) used their oil reserves as a weapon with the Arab Oil Embargo against those who supported Israel. By January 1974, world oil prices were four times higher than they were at the start of the crisis, especially in the US, and the shock led to a huge drop in the stock market with NYSE losing $97bn in just six weeks.  The embargo lasted five months, and the effects are still seen today.

German hyperinflation

1922-1923

Hyperinflation
1923 – 1924
Stabilisation

 

The trouble began when Germany missed a repatriation payment, worth about one third of the German deficit in this period. Inflation was already high but by 1923 it was raging. Prices doubled within hours, and by late 1923, it cost 200bn marks to buy a single loaf of bread. People burned money as it was cheaper than buying firewood. Germany eventually regained control of its economy when it introduced the Rentenmark into circulation in 1923, and then the Reichmark in 1924.

The Great Depression

1929-1933
The Great Crash
1934-1939
Recovery and Recession

 

After the decadence of the Roaring Twenties, the 1930s saw the biggest economic slump of all time. The stock market crashed on 29 October 1929, and optimism and decadent living tumbled along with the figures. The GDP fell from $103.6bn in 1929, to $66bn in 1934 and the subsequent years of recovery were the most dramatic in US history.

1907 bankers’ panic

1907
Otto Heinze and his brother Augustus Heinze bought shares of United Copper.

 

The stock market was already cautious over the tight money supply, but the US was thrown into a depression after the stock market fell nearly 50 percent from its peak in 1906. The Heinze brothers thought they could influence market shares but ended up bankrupting lenders that provided the financing to buy the stock. A chain reaction left nine institutions bankrupt. By February 1908, the panic was over and the government created the Federal Reserve system, to prevent banks from exercising too much control over the economy.